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The Effect of Curriculum-Based 
External Exit Exam Systems 
on Student Achievement 
John H. Bishop 
Two presidents, the National Governors Association, and numerous blue-ribbon 
panels have called for the development of state or national content standards for 
core subjects and examinations that assess student achievement of these standards. 
The Competitiveness Policy Council (1993. 30), for example, advocated that 
"external assessments be given to individual students at the secondary level and 
that the results should be a major but not exclusive factor qualifying for college and 
better jobs at better wages." It is claimed that curriculum-based external exit exam 
systems (CBEEESs) based on explicit content standards will improve the teaching 
and learning of core subjects. What evidence is there for this claim? Outside the 
United States. such systems are the rule, not the exception. What impacts have such 
systems had on school policies, teaching, and student learning'? 
WHAT IS A CURRICULUM-BASED EXTERNAL EXIT 
EXAMINATION SYSTEM? 
A curriculum-based external exit examination system has several characteristics: 
1. It produces signals of student accomplishment that have real consequences 
for the student. 
2. It defines achievement relative to an external standard, not relative to other 
students in the classroom or the school. Thus, fair comparisons of achievement 
across schools and across students at different schools are possible. Costrell's 
(1994) analysis of the optimal setting of education standards concluded that a 
more centralized setting of standards (state or national achievement exams) 
results in higher standards, achievement, and social welfare than a decentralized 
setting of standards (i.e., teacher grading or schools' graduation requirements). 
3. It is organized by discipline and keyed to the content of specific course 
sequences, which focuses responsibility for preparing the student for particular 
exams on one or a small group of teachers. 
4. It signals multiple levels of achievement in the subject. If only a pass-fail 
signal is generated by an exam, the standard will have to be set low enough to 
allow almost everyone to pass and this will not stimulate the great bulk of stu- 
dents to greater effort (Kang 1985; Costrell 1994). 
- ~p ~p 
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5.  It covers almost all secondary school students. Exams for elite schools, 
advanced courses. or college applicants will influence standards at the top of the 
~ert ical  curriculum but will probably have limited effects on the rest of the stu- 
dents. The school system as a whole must accept responsibility for how students 
do on the exams. A single exam taken by all is not essential. Many nations allow 
students to choose which subjects to be examined in and offer high- and inter- 
mediate-level exams in the same subject. 
Commercially prepared achievement tests such as the CAT, CTBS, ITBS, and 
ITED are not CBEEESs, because they fail the first characteristic. Students have 
no stake in doing well on these tests. Where stakes are attached to student per- 
formance. teachers and school administrators experience the consequences, not 
individual students. 
The minimum competency exams that many American states require students 
to pass to graduate from secondary school are not a CBEEES because they fail 
characteristics three and four. These tests focus on basic skills taught in primary 
and the lower grades of secondary schools. Although minimum competency 
exams have apparently reduced the numbers of students with very low basic 
skills levels (Lerner 1991). the passing standard is quite low. The tests are typi- 
cally taken in 9th or 10th grade, and most students pass on the first sitting. High 
school transcripts indicate only whether the student eventually passes the test, 
not achievement levels above the minimum. Thus, for the great majority of stu- 
dents who pass them on the first try, the tests do not stimulate further study. 
Incentive effects are focused on the small number who fail on the first try and 
must repeat the test. Minimum competency exams can be a useful part of a 
CBEEES. but other more demanding curriculum-based exams requiring higher 
levels of performance are essential. 
Characteristic 4 is essential because of its impact on the incentive effects of 
exams. By age 13, students differ dramatically in their levels of achievement. On 
the National Assessment of Educational Progress test, 7-9 percent of 13-year- 
olds were four or more grade-level equivalents (GLE) behind students of their 
age, and 15-17 percent were four or more grade-level equivalents ahead of stu- 
dents of their age. With achievement differentials this large, incentives for effort 
are stronger for most students if the full range of achievement is signaled rather 
than just whether the individual has passed some absolute standard. When only 
a pass-fail grade is generated by a test, many students pass without exertion and 
are, thus, not stimulated to greater effort by the reward for passing. Some of the 
least well prepared students will judge the effort required to achieve the standard 
to be too great and the benefits too small to warrant the effort, and they give up 
on meeting the standard. Few students will find the reward for exceeding a sin- 
gle absolute cutoff an incentive for greater effort (Kang 1985). Costrell agrees: 
"The case for perfect information [making scores on external examinations avail- 
able rather than just whether the individual passed or failed] would appear to be 
strong, if not airtight: for most plausible degrees of heterogeneity, egalitarianism, 
and pooling under decentralization, perfect information not only raises GDP, but 
also social welfare" (1994, 970). 
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The SAT-I reasoning tests are not CBEEESs because they do not meet charac- 
teristics three and five. They are not organized around school subjects and fail to 
assess most of the material-history, science, economics, civics, literature, for- 
eign languages, and the ability to write an essay-that high school students are 
expected to learn. The SAT was designed to minimize any effects on high school 
teaching and student study habits. Richard Gummere, Harvard College's admis- 
sions director at the time the machine-scored multiple-choice SAT replaced the 
curriculum-based essay-style College Board Examinations, was candid about 
why the SAT had been adopted: "Learning in itself has ceased to be the main fac- 
tor [in college admissions]. The aptitude of the pupil is now the leading consid- 
eration" (Gummere 1943,5). The subject-specific SAT-I1 achievement tests meet 
some of the requirements of a CBEEES but, because colleges admit on the basis 
of the SAT-I, not SAT-11, the stakes are low and few students take them. 
The Advanced Placement (AP) examinations are the one exception to the gen- 
eralization that the United States lacks a national CBEEES. Although growing 
rapidly, AP is still a very small program. In 1995, only 3.2 percent of juniors and 
seniors took AP English or AP history exams. and only 2 percent took AP calcu- 
lus or science exams (National Education Goals Panel 1995). Low participation 
means that AP exams fail characteristic five and are, consequently, not a CBEEES. 
They can, however, serve as a component of a larger system. 
WHY ARE CBEEESs HYPOTHESIZED TO INCREASE ACHIEVEMENT? 
A CBEEES improves the signaling of academic achievement. As a result, col- 
leges and employers are likely to give greater weight to academic achievement 
when they make admission and hiring decisions, so the rewards for learning 
should grow and become more visible. A CBEEES also shifts attention toward 
measures of absolute achievement and away from measures of relative achieve- 
ment such as class rank and teacher grades. 
Grading on a curve or basing college admissions on class rank gives students 
a personal interest in persuading each other not to study. The serious student 
makes it more difficult for others to get top grades. When exams are graded on a 
curve, joint welfare is maximized when no one studies. Side payments of friend- 
ship and respect and punishments of ridicule and harassment enforce the coop- 
I 
erative "don't study" solution. When learning is assessed relative to an outside 
standard, students no longer have a personal interest in getting teachers off track 
or persuading each other to refrain from studying. 
In the absence of a CBEEES, school reputations are largely outside the control 
of school staff, they are determined instead by the social class of the student body, 
I 
mean SAT scores, and numbers attending prestigious colleges. When a CBEEES is 
in place, exam results displace social class as the primary determinant of school 
reputations and, in turn, school staff are induced to give enhanced learning higher 
priority. Teachers will upgrade curricula and assign more homework and parents 
will demand better science labs and more rigorous teaching. School administrators 
will be pressured to increase the time devoted to examination subjects and hire 
more qualified teachers. The competition for teachers is likely to bid up salaries. 
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A further benefit of a CBEEES is the professional development that teachers 
receive when they are brought to centralized locations to grade the extended- 
answer portions of the exams. In May 1996, I interviewed a number of Alberta 
teachers about their experiences as members of grading committees. They all said 
that having to discuss and agree with their colleagues about what constituted an 
excellent, good, adequate, poor, and failing response to essay questions had been 
their best professional development experience since entering the profession. 
DO CBEEESs INCREASE ACHIEVEMENT? 
A LOOK AT THE EVIDENCE 
I tested the hypothesis that CBEEESs improve achievement by comparing 
nations, states, and provinces that do and do not have such systems. Three dif- 
ferent data sets were examined: science and mathematics achievement in the 40- 
nation Third International Math and Science Study (TIMSS), science and math 
scores on the International Assessment of Educational Progress (IAEP) for 16 
nations. and SAT test scores for New York State versus other states. 
Third International Mathematics and Science Study 
The just-released TIMSS provides 1994-95 data for seventh and eighth 
graders in 40 countries. I reviewed comparative education studies, government 
documents, and education encyclopedias and interviewed embassy personnel and 
Cornell graduate students from the countries to determine which of the TIMSS 
nations have CBEEEs in secondary school.' Twenty-two national school systems 
were classified as having CBEEEs for math and science in all parts of the coun- 
try: Austria, Bulgaria. Columbia, Czech Republic, Denmark, England, Hong 
Kong, Hungary, Ireland, Iran, Israel. Japan. Korea, Lithuania. the Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Russia, Scotland, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and Thai- 
land. Three countries-France, Iceland, and Romania-had CBEEEs in mathe- 
matics but not in science. Five countries-Australia, Canada, Germany, Switzer- 
land, and the United States-had CBEEEs in some states or provinces but not in 
others. Norway had regular exit examinations in mathematics but examined sci- 
ence only every few years. Latvia was assigned a .5 on the CBEEES variable 
because it was in transition away from a CBEEES. The countries having a 
CBEEE in either subject were Belgium (both Flemish- and French-speaking sys- 
tems), Cyprus, Greece, the Philippines, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden. The uni- 
versity entrance examinations in Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Cyprus, and the 
ACT and SAT in the United States were not considered to be CBEEESs (Madeus 
and Kelleghan 1991). University entrance exams should have much smaller 
incentive effects because students headed into the job market do not take them 
and teachers can avoid responsibility for their students' exam results by arguing 
that not everyone is college material or that examiners set unreasonably high 
standards to limit enrollment in higher education. 
Twenty-three of the TIMSS countries are ranked by the science achievement 
of their 13-year-olds in Figure 1.' The United States ranks number 9 in science. 
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The gaps between the vertical grid lines represent one United States grade-level 
equivalent-the difference between seventh and eighth grade TIMSS test score 
means for the United States. Achievement differentials across nations are very 
large. In science, Singapore and Korea are more than one GLE ahead of the Unit- 
ed States, and Portugal, Cyprus, and France are more than two GLEs behind. 
The mean seventh and eighth grade science and mathematics test scores for all 
40 TIMSS countries were regressed on per capita gross domestic product (GDP) 
for 1987 and 1990, deflated by a purchasing power parity price index. a dummy 
for East Asian nations, and a dummy for CBEEES. The results indicate that test 
FIGURE 1 
TIMSS Science Achievement at Age 13: Children of High School Graduates 
No Curriculum-Based 
External Exit Exam 
Po 
4 -3 -2 -1 0 I 2 
Grade Level Equivalents Relative to the United States 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 
scores were significantly higher in nations with higher per capita product, East 
Asian nations, and nations with a CBEEES (Table 1). 
The analysis of achievement at a particular grade level may have been biased, 
however. by differing policies regarding grade retention, age of school entry, and 
which grade was chosen for assessment. CBEEESs. for example, might have been 
associated with high rates of grade retention. Therefore, a preferable dependent 
variable is a measure of student achievement at some fixed age. The third and 
fourth rows of the first two panels in Table 1 present estimates of the median test 
score for each nation's 13-year-olds (Beaton et al. 1996a,; Beaton et al. 1996b, 
Table 1.5). For countries not included in this table, the 13-year-old median was esti- 
mated by age adjusting the seventh and eighth grade means."witching to the age- 
constant achievement reduced the estimated impact of a CBEEES. The CBEEES 
coefficient had a p value of .08 (two-tailed test) in the mathematics model and a p 
value of .Ol (two-tailed test) in the science model. The estimated impacts are sub- 
stantively important: 1.3 U.S. GLEs in science and 1.0 U.S. GLEs in mathematics. 
TABLE 1 
The Effect of Curriculum-Based External Exams on Science and Mathematics Achievement 
External LnGDPPop East K-12 spending Adj R' 
Variable exit exam 1987 & 90 Asia IGDP RMSE 
TIMSS Science-1994 (U.S. GLE = 261 
Mean. 7th graders 38.0*** 
(2.93) 
Mean, 8th graders 42.4*** 
(3.40) 
Median, 13-yr.-olds 34.9*** 
(.277) 
Median, 13-yr.-olds 32.0*** 
(2.57) 
TIMSS Mntll-1994 ( U S .  GLE = 2 4 )  
Mean. 7th graders 29.6** 
(2.09) 
Mean. 8th graders 36.0** 
(2.54) 
Median. 13-yr.-old5 24.7* 
(1.82) 
Median. 13-yr.-olds 21.5 
(1.55) 
IAEP-1991 (U.S. GLE = 6,for Science and 8 for Math) 
Science LTr correct 4.3 1.7 9.6** 
( 1.72) ( 5 1  (2.81) 
Math 40 correct 15.7*** 3.7 16.1t* 
(3.85) (.251 (2.81) 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are r values. TIMSS = Third International Math and Science Study. GLE = grade- 
level equivalent. lAEP = International Assessment of Educational Progress?. 
' p  < .Ol, two-tailed test; **p < .05. two-tailed test: ***p < .MI. two-tailed test. 
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CBEEESs may improve achievement by inducing greater social investments in 
education. Row 4 (Table 1 )  presents results of regressions that add the share of 
GDP spent on education to the standard model. Coefficients on this variable were 
positive for both outcomes and significantly so for science. The estimated impact 
of spending was modest, however. A one percentage point increase in the share 
of GDP devoted to education increased the science achievement of 13-year-olds 
by one-half a GLE. 
Analysis of the 1991 International Assessment of Educational Progress 
The 199 1 International Assessment of Educational Progress (IAEP) data set 
can also be tested for CBEEES effects. Fifteen nations were available for the 
analysis: England, France, Hungary, Ireland. Israel, Emilia Romagna/Northern 
Italy, Korea, Portugal. Scotland, Slovenia, Soviet Union, Spain, Swit~erland, Tai- 
wan, and the United States. 
I regressed the mean percentage correct (adjusted for guessing) for 13-year-old 
students on the same set of variables as in the analysis of the TTMSS data (Table 
1 ). For mathematics, the effect of CBEEEs was highly significant and quite large. 
Because the U.S. standard deviation was 26.8 percentage points in mathematics, 
the CBEEE effect on math was more than one-half of a U.S. standard deviation 
or about two U.S. GLEs. CBEEEs had smaller nonsignificant effects on science 
achievement. East Asian students scored significantly higher than students in 
Europe and North America. Coefficients on per capita GDP were positive but not 
statistically significant. These results are consistent with the causal hypotheses 
presented above. Causation is not proved, however, because other explanations 
can no doubt be proposed. 
Other sources of variation in curriculum-based exams need to be analyzed. 
Best of all would be a study that held national culture constant. For example. stu- 
dents in Canadian provinces with a CBEEES outperform students in the rest of 
Canada (Bishop 1996). 
THE IMPACT ON NEW YORK STATE REGENTS EXAMINATIONS 
In the early 1990s. New York State was the only state with a CBEEES. It has 
been administering curriculum-based Regents examinations to high school stu- 
dents since June 1878. Sherman Tinkelman, Assistant Commissioner for Exam- 
inations and Scholarships. described these exams in a 1966 report. 
The Regents examinations are closely related to the curriculum in New York State. 
They are, as you can see, inseparably intertwined. One supports and reinforces the 
other. . . . These instruments presuppose and define standards. . . . They are a strong 
supervisory and instructional tool-and deliberately so. They are effective in stimu- 
lating good teaching and good learning practices. (1966. 12) 
Students took these examinations throughout their high school years. A stu- 
dent tak~ng a full qchedule of college preparatory Regents courses would typi- 
cally take Regents exams in mathematics and earth science at the end of 9th 
grade; mathematics. biology, and global studies exams at the end of 10th grade; 
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mathematics. chemistry, English, and foreign language at the end of I 1 th grade; 
and physics at the end of 12th grade. 
In 1993, about 56 percent of 9th graders took the Mathematics Course 1 exam 
and, of these, 24 percent scored below the 65 percent passing grade. Similar pro- 
portions of 10th and l lth graders took the global studies, biology, and English 
exams. Failure rates were 20 percent in global studies, 18 percent in biology, and 
13 percent in English. Students not taking Regents exams were typically in 
courses that were considerably less challenging. A system of minimum compe- 
tency tests in specific subjects set a minimum standard for these students but, as 
in other states, the passing standard was low. 
Impacts on Achievement 
New York's students are more disadvantaged, more heavily minority, and more 
likely to be foreign born than students in most other states. Among northern 
states, only Maryland, Delaware, and Illinois have a larger share of African 
American pupils. Nationwide, only California has a greater share of its popula- 
tion foreign born, and only California, Texas, Arizona, New Mexico, and Col- 
orado have larger Hispanic population shares. Literacy levels among New York 
adults are substantially below the national average (National Education Goals 
Panel 1995, vol. 2). 
Consequently, when one compares student achievement levels, family back- 
ground must be taken into account. Considering the high incidence of at-risk 
children, New York students do remarkably well. The proportions of students tak- 
ing algebra. calculus. chemistry, and physics are generally above national aver- 
ages. A larger proportion of New York's 1 lth and 12th graders take and pass (9.4 
percent) AP exams in English, science, math, or history than any other state 
except Utah (NGEP 1993, vol. 2). 
Graham and Husted's (1993) analysis of SAT test scores in the 37 states with 
reasonably large test-taking populations found that New York students did better 
than comparable students in other states. They did not, however, test the statistical 
significance of the New York State effect and used an unusual log-log specification. 
The results of a linear regression predicting 199 1 mean SAT-M + SAT-V test 
scores for the 37 states for which data are available are presented in Table 2. With 
the exception of the dummy variable for New York State (NYS) , all right-hand- 
side variables of the equation are proportions-generally the share of the test- 
taking population with the characteristic described. Clearly, New Yorkers did sig- 
nificantly better on the SAT than students of the same race and social background 
living in other states. When this model was estimated without the NYS dummy 
variable. New York had the largest positive residual in the sample. The next 
largest (Wisconsin's) positive residual was 87 percent of New York's residual. 
Illinois and Nevada had positive residuals that were about 58 percent of New 
York's value. Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, New Mexico, Ohio, Rhode 
Island, Texas, and Washington had negative residuals greater than 10 points. 
Many of these states had large populations of Hispanics and recent immigrants, 
a trait that was not controlled for in the analysis. New York's achievement is all 
178 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC EDUCATION 






















































Determinants of Mean Total SAT-I Scores for States 
Coefficients of explanatory variables 
Dependent Partic. Parents Private Prop. Large 3+Math 3+Eng. InTeach InExpend R? 
var~able NY S rate AA-BA+ school black school courses courses /stud /<tud RMSE 
SAT-I" 46** -68** 370*** 60 -1 35 4 4 *  85 -3 6 
(2.7) (2.6) (6.4) ( 1.6) (3.2) (1.8) (1.3) (.31 
SAT-I" .35* -88*** 367*** 69* -1 1.7 -36 45 4 5  48* 13 ,933 
(2.0) (3.3) (6.6) (1.9) (2.6) (1.5) (.7) (.4) (1.7) (3 )  14.2 
Mean ,027 ,414 .58 1 ,207 .078 ,129 .6 17 .797 -2.822 1.648 
SD ,164 ,240 ,097 ,082 .Oh4 .I 13 .Oh7 .038 .I 13 .2 15 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are r values. 
'The dependent variable has a mean of 925 and a standard deviation cif 55.  
* p  < .Ol, two-tailed teqr; **p  < .US, two-tailed test: ***p < .001. two-tailed test. 
the more remarkable when one considers that Hispanics and immigrants are a 
large share of its school children. 
For individuals, the summed SAT-V + SAT-M has a standard deviation of 
approximately 200 points. Consequently, the differential between New York's SAT 
mean and the prediction for New York based on outcomes in the other 36 states is 
about 20 percent of a standard deviation or about three-quarters of a GLE. 
Adding the teacher-pupil ratio and spending per pupil to the model reduces the 
NYS coefficient by 25 percent. It remains significantly greater than zero, how- 
ever. The significant coefficient on teacher-pupil ratio suggests that heavy invest- 
ment in K-12 schooling in New York State (possibly stimulated in part by the 
Regents exam system) may be one of the reasons why New York state students 
perform better than comparable students in other states. 
Does New York State Invest More in K-12 Education? 
The theory predicts that the existence of its CBEEES will induce New York 
State to spend more on K-12 education and focus that spending on instruction. 
Indeed, New York's ratio of K-12 teacher salaries to college faculty salaries is 
significantly above average. New York teachers are also more likely to have mas- 
ter's degrees than the teachers of any state except Connecticut and Indiana. New 
York ranks number 7 in both the teacher-pupil ratios and the ratio of per pupil 
spending to gross state product per capita (Bishop 1996). 
Clearly, New York invests a great deal in its K-12 education system. If the cause 
of the high spending was a strong general commitment to education or legislative 
profligacy, one would expect spending to be high on both K-12 and higher educa- 
tion. This is not the case. Relative to other states, New York invests much more in 
K-I 2 education than in higher education. New York ranks number one in the ratio 
of K-12 spending per pupil to higher education spending per college student. 
The Regents exams are currently medium-stakes tests, not high stakes tests. 
Exam grades count for less than a third of the final grade in the course and influ- 
ence only the type of diploma received. Employers ignore these exam results when 
they make hiring decisions. During the 1980s, scholarships sponsored by the 
Regents were based on aptitude test scores, not Regents exam results. Passing 
scores on Regents exams are not necessary for admission to community colleges 
o r  out-of-state colleges. Students are aware that they can avoid Regents courses and 
still go to college. Indeed some perceive an advantage to avoiding them. 
My counselor wanted me to take Regents history and I did for a while. But it was 
pretty hard and the teacher moved fast. I switched to the other history and I'm get- 
ting better grades. So my average will be better for college. Unless you are going to 
d college In the \late. it doesn't really matter whether you get a Regent's d~ploma. 
(Ward 1994, 2) 
Indeed, the small payoff to taking Regents exams may be one of the reasons why 
so many students have not been taking Regents courses. 
This is about to change. The Board of Regents has announced that students 
graduating in the year 2000 must take a new six-hour Regents English examina- 
tion and pass it at the 55 percent level. The class of 2001 has the additional require- 
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ment o f  passing a six-hour examination in algebra and geometry. The class o f  2002 
must also pass two six-hour Regents examinations in global studies and American 
history. When laboratory science exams are required, the phase-in o f  all five new 
required Regents exams will be completed with the graduating class o f  2003. Once 
the system has adjusted to the new exams, the Regents intend to raise the scores 
necessary to pass from the 55 percent to 60 percent and then to 65 percent. 
CONCLUSIONS 
A review o f  the evidence suggests that advocates o f  standards and examina- 
tion-based reform o f  American secondary education may be right. The countries 
and Canadian provinces with such systems outperform other countries at a com- 
parable level o f  development. New York State, the only state with a CBEEES, 
does remarkably well on the SAT test when student demography is held constant. 
In addition, Bishop and Moriarty (1977) show that on NAEP mathematics tests, 
New York's eighth graders outperform students with comparable socio-econom- 
ic backgrounds in other states by roughly a grade-level equivalent. CBEEESs are, 
however. probably not the most important determinant o f  achievement levels. 
CBEEESs are common in developing nations where achievement levels are often 
quite low (e.g., Columbia and Iran). Belgium, by contrast, has a top-quality edu- 
cation system without having a CBEEES. More research on the effects o f  
CBEEESs is clearly in order. 
What are the implications o f  these findings for the National Council on Eco- 
nomic Education's efforts to upgrade economics education in America's sec- 
ondary schools? The primary implication is that high school students should be 
offered externally examined economics courses. Externally examined high 
school courses-Advanced Placement, International Baccalaureate, Regents 
courses-are growing in popularity. Both the International Baccalaureate and 
Advanced Placement programs have externally examined economics courses. 
The council has developed curriculum content standards for economics to serve 
as a guide for the planned NAEP assessment o f  economics and for states seeking 
to promulgate standards for economics. The next logical step is to create a secure 
external examination reflecting these content standards that can be used for cer- 
tifying the economics competence o f  high school students who are not seeking 
college credit for the course. This step should attract additional high school stu- 
dents to the subject, upgrade the quality o f  economics instruction, and improve 
student study incentives. 
NOTES 
1 .  A list of the interviews conducted and the books and documents consulted is available from the 
author. 
2. The sample of countries in Figure I are those that either have or do not have a CBEEE in science 
throughout the country and that have per capita GDP of at least one-third of the U.S. level. 
3. The Philippines, for example, had a math score mean of 399 in eighth grade and a mean of 386 in 
>eventh grade. The mean age of eighth graders was 14, and the mean age of seventh graders was 
12.9. The math score for 13.5-year-olds was estimated by interpolation between seventh and 
eighth grade means. Math13.5 = 386 + (399-386)*[(13.5-12.9)/(14-12.9)]. 
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